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MOTORCYCLE HELMETS AND THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
SELF-PROTECTIVE
LEGISLATION
The New York legislature, in 1966, passed a law requiring all
motorcycle drivers and passengers to wear protective crash helmets
while operating or riding their vehicles.1 Several other states imme-
diately followed suit.2 By July, 1967, the helmet requirement had
achieved the status of a federal "minimum standard" to which all
state highway safety programs were to conform.3 It has practically
become a nationwide requirement.4
Since their enactment, these helmet statutes have been chal-
lenged in one form or another in at least 14 different jurisdictions,
usually without success.5 This of course is, at first glance, a predict-
able result, since the regulation of traffic on public highways has
traditionally been viewed as one of the cornerstones of a state's
police power. 6 Perhaps, in light of the general subject matter in-
volved, it is a little surprising that the assault against these statutes
has succeeded at all. Yet no less than 9 decisions7 have been rendered
in favor of the cyclists, a fact which, standing alone, might make this
a noteworthy controversy.
1 N. Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 381(6) (McKinney Supp. 1968-69).
2 E.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 257.658(d) (1967), originally enacted July 11,
1966; MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 7 (Supp. 1968), enacted Feb. 21, 1967.
3 National Uniform Standards for State Highway Safety Programs, H. R. Doc.
No. 138, 90TH CONG., lsT Sass. 3-4 (1967) [Hereinafter cited as H. R. Doc. No. 138,
90-1].
4 See notes 20 and 21, infra.
5 See cases cited notes 7, 10, 19, 75 and 77, infra. The other three jurisdictions
where the question has arisen are: State v. Edwards, No. 582370 (Minneapolis Mun.
Ct., Aug. 10, 1968); South Dakota Dealers Ass'n v. Parker, letter opinion of F. G. Dunn,
Circuit Judge of 2d Jud. Cir., S.D., dated Oct. 17, 1967; and Bisenius v. Karns, No.
124423 (Dane County Cir. Ct., Wis., May 14, 1968).
6 Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959), South Carolina v. Barn-
well Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
7 Everhardt v. New Orleans, 208 So. 2d 423 (La. App. 1968), rer'd., - La. -, 217
So. 2d 400 (1968); American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, 158 N.W2d 72 (Mich. App.
1968), but see, note 98, and accompanying text, infra. 1966 N. M. Att'y Gen. Rep.
19 (No. 66-15); People v. Smallwood, 52 Misc. 2d 1027, 277 N.YS.2d 429 (1967); People
v. Carmichael, 53 Misc. 2d 584, 279 N.Y.S.2d 272, rev'd., 56 Misc. 2d 388, 288 N.Y.S.2d
931 (1968); State v. Babbs, No. 80-330 (Martin County Ct., Fla., Sept. 6, 1968) following
State v. Eitel, No. 68M-7013, -7014, -7234 (Magis. Ct., Palm Beach County, Fla. Aug.
27, 1968); Seattle v. Zektzer, (Seattle Mun. Ct., undated); People v. Duncan, No.
44835 (Wayne County Cir. Ct, Mich. 1967).
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But of greater import in these cases is the judicial treatment be-
ing accorded to the central issue-the validity of self-protective leg-
islation. The cyclists have contended that the sole purpose of the
helmet requirement is to compel a certain class of individuals to
minimize their own risk of injury, and that no other member of the
non-cycling public can possibly be affected in any material way by
the statutes' enforcement. This being so, no discernible, commonly
accepted public interest is served by this legislation. Further, in a
nation where individuality is deemed an important, if not the ulti-
mate value, the individual is, or ought to be, free to conduct him-
self according to his own personal dictates, unless that conduct so
interferes with the interests of another as to justify legislative inter-
vention. Thus, without establishing the existence of such a recog-
nized public need, state legislatures are simply lacking in authority
to act on behalf of the "general welfare."8 In short, so the cyclists
contend, self-protective laws are ultra vires.
As might be expected, this does not comport with constitutional
doctrine as the states view it. They have responded with a familiar
argument-the presumption of constitutionality attending any po-
lice power regulation. The legislatures alone have the power to de-
cide what the public interest demands, and their judgment must be
upheld if ". . . any state of facts, either known or which could rea-
sonably be assumed, affords support for it." Moreover, no "specific"
constitutional prohibition has been transgressed by the helmet stat-
utes, nor has any allegation of such been made. And to these points,
the three supreme courts which have ruled on the matter have
agreed.10 Yet for several reasons, this presumption of constitutional-
ity response does not appear wholly adequate to answer the cyclists'
objection, especially in the factual context of this particular litiga-
tion.
It is suggested that the issue involved herein, self-protective reg-
ulation, is somewhat novel and merits more than a cursory reference
8 Brief for Plaintiffs and Appellants at 4, American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids,
158 N.W.2d 72 (Mich. App. 1968) [Hereinafter cited as A.M.A. Brief in Davids];
Brief for Appellees as Amicus Curiae at 3, Everhardt v. New Orleans, - La. -, 217
So. 2d 400 (1968) [Hereinafter cited as Amicus Brief in Everhardt]. Note that the
term "cyclists," as used in this article, refers to the position taken by the American
Motorcycle Ass'n in the aforecited cases.
9 United States v. Caroline Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938).
10 State ex rel. Colvin v. Lombardi, - RI. -, 241 A.2d 625 (1968); Common-
wealth v. Howie, - Mass. -, 238 N.E.2d 373; cert. denied, 89 Sup. Ct. 485 (1968),
Everhardt v. New Orleans, - La. -, 217 So. 2d 400 (1968).
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to the language usually employed in police power cases. For the ob-
jection raised by the cyclists touches on what is perhaps the most
fundamental of legal issues--man's relation to the state. If it is de-
termined that the state has the inherent power to force an individ-
ual, on pain of criminal sanctions, to protect himself against poten-
tial harm arising in his everyday activity, then a more detailed
analysis of this power seems appropriate. The very basis for the au-
thority to regulate in this area, and its possible implications, ought
to be explored. As a start in this direction, this article will attempt
to identify the nature of the problem as it is presented in the helmet
cases, and the possible interests asserted by both sides to the dispute.
I. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF THE HELMET REQUIREMENT
1966 was a year of considerable agitation over the rising slaugh-
ter on public highways. In 1965, it is estimated that over 49,000 peo-
ple lost their lives in traffic accidents throughout the nation." Fur-
thermore, with 1,500,000 disabling injuries and about 8.5 billion
dollars in property damage recorded,' 2 the cost to the American peo-
ple in lost wages, in medical bills, and especially in personal tragedy
was incalculable. The call for legislative action to reduce this mount-
ing toll was dearly in order.13
Congress responded with the "Highway Safety Act of 1966,'1 4
which directed each state to have a highway safety program designed
to reduce the deaths and injuries resulting from traffic accidents. 15
This Act authorized 100 million dollars per year in federal appro-
priations to aid the states in carrying out these programs and pro-
vided that such were to be implemented no later than January 1,
1969.1 In addition, it also specified that 10% of the funds normally
apportioned to each state would be deducted if that state failed to
comply with the uniform standards established by the Secretary of
Commerce [now Secretary of Transportation]. 17 As part of the over-
all scheme, each state was to institute a motorcycle safety program
11 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Naws, 2741, 2743 (1966); Motor Vehicle and flighway
Safety Acts of 1966 with Explanation, CCH PRODS. LIjAExuT Rr. No. 86, 1 (Extra
ed., Sept. 12, 1966) [Hereinafter cited as Fed. Safety Acts of 1966, CCH REP.]
12 Id.
13 Materials cited note 11, supra.
'4 80 Stat. 731, 737 (1966).
15 80 Stat. 731 (1966), 23 U.S.C.A. § 402(a) (Supp. 1967).
'6 Id. § 402(c) ($100 million was authorized for fiscal years ending in 1968 and
1969).
17 Id.
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and, particularly, to require, as a "minimum," that ". . . protective
safety equipment for drivers and passengers... be worn, [including]
... an approved safety helmet and eye protection when... operat-
ing [a] vehicle on streets and highways."' 8 Hence, each state was
presumably obligated to pass such a law to remain qualified for all
the federal grants available under this program. 19 Apparently in
order to conform to these provisions, some 36 states have now
enacted motorcycle helmet statutes; of these, 13 have also included a
specific face shield or goggle requirement. 20
To intimate that this standard was imposed upon the states,
however, would be misleading. The uniform standards were to be
".. . developed in cooperation with the states" 21 and the need for
motorcycle safety generally was widely felt, as indicated by the back-
ground information in the Secretary of Transportation's report.
Deaths and injuries from motorcycle accidents doubled between
1963 and 1965. This fact is particularly alarming when it is
understood that most of those killed and injured were young
people under the age of 25. Motorcycle registrations have
jumped from 574,080 in 1960 to 1,914,700 in 1966. By 1970 the
annual increase is expected to reach 1 million per year. Motor-
cycle safety takes on grave dimensions in view of the fact that
since 1960 the rate of motorcycle fatalities has increased at about
the same rate as the number of motorcycles [i.e. almost 32
times in 6 years] [Emphasis added.]22
Thus, the helmet requirement itself was most probably incorporated
in the federal standards on the recommendation of several states.
New York's statute, enacted on August 2, 1966, before the Highway
Safety Act became law, was passed at the request of its own Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles following an extensive review of the prob-
lem.23 Its statistics on the subject are equally impressive.
18 H. R. Doc. No. 138, 90-1 at 4 (Standard No. 3 of the 13 original minimum
standards promulgated by the Secretary of Transportation on June 27, 1967, pursuant
to § 203 of Pub. L. 89-564, 80 Stat. 731, 736 (1966)).
19 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 317.981 (1968) actually refers to the "1966 national highway
safety act"; see also, Everhardt v. New Orleans, - La. -, 217 So. 2d 400 (1968) and
Hutchinson v. Silvey, No. CR 8081 (Dist. Ct. of Reno County, Kan., Dec. 11, 1968)
suggesting that compliance with the federal standard was probably the motivating
force behind passage of those laws.
20 CYCLE BuyvR's GUIDE 138 (1968).
21 23 U.S.C.A. § 402(e) (Supp. 1967).
22 H.R. Doc. No. 138, 90-1, at 3 ("Background" for standard No. 3).
23 N.Y. SESSION LAws 2961 (McKinney, 1966); see also, statutes cited note 2, supra,
which were enacted prior to the promulgation of the federal standards.
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... A Summary of the Department statistics indicates that 89.2%
of the motorcycle accidents result in injury or death and that
almost all fatalities occurring as a result of such accidents involve
head injuries. Most of these fatalities could have been avoided,
or the severity lessened, by the use of a proper helmet.24
The data clearly supports the legislative judgment that motorcycling
is not only far more dangerous than driving an automobile, but that
it is also much more likely to lead to serious head injury.25 The New
York commission which studied the matter concluded that its bill
".... should go far in protecting the drivers and passengers on mo-
torcycles."026
Some cyclists, on the other hand, doubt the appropriateness of
the legislative response. The helmets, they maintain, tend to ob-
struct their hearing and peripheral vision, and the face shields tend
to collect moisture and "fog up"; the whole apparatus is generally
distracting.27 They assert that, despite what the evidence tends to
show, helmets may actually contribute to more accidents, due to
their obstructive qualities, and thereby negate any alleged decrease
in risks associated with their use. This argument of course is factu-
ally debatable and, therefore, bears only on the "reasonableness" of
the regulation. That is, it casts doubt only on whether the legislative
means selected, helmets, actually promotes the police power goal of
safety. Without more, the legislative judgment on this particular
should clearly control, in accordance with traditional notions of
constitutional law.28 But that does not dispose of the matter here.
II. THE PROBLEM OF THE PUBLIC EVIL
The more difficult question in the helmet litigation is the iden-
tification of precisely what constitutes the public evil to be reme-
died. It is perhaps this feature which gives the dispute its "unique
24 Id. at 2962.
25 "Michigan State Police datum 1962-66 (Exhibit A) shows a mortality rate of 11.5
for 10,000 registrations of motorcycles, as compared with 5.2 per 10,000 for all vehicles
in the same period." American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, 158 N.V.2d 72, 75, n.9
(Mich. App. 1968). However, this figure is not reflective of the total statewide picture
since ". . . accidents which occurred in cities over 25,000 population [were] not
included in this summary," Brief for Defendants and Appellees in Exhibit A, Ameri-
can Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, supra.
26 N.Y. SEsSION LAws 2961 (MeKinney, 1966).
27 Amicus Brief in Everhardt at 1.
28 Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949). See also text
accompanying note 34, infra.
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legal character."29 The argument centers not so much on policy, i.e.,
whether a public evil exists at all, nor on the method chosen to cure
it, but more specifically on how others are hurt by the activity pro-
scribed. The distinction warrants articulation.
A. Police Power Requirements and the Helmet Law
The "police power" of a state is usually described as the broad,
inherent power of the legislature to prescribe regulations which pro-
mote the education, health, safety, peace, morals, and general wel-
fare of the community.30 Accordingly, in order to implement this
power,
. .. a large discretion is necessarily vested in the legislature to
determine, not only what the interests of the public require, but
what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests
[citations omitted]. To justify the state in thus interposing its
authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference; and, second, that the
means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose... 31
The large majority of police power cases ostensibly deal with the
second requirement expressed, i.e., whether the means selected rea-
sonably relates to and advances any of the traditional police power
ends. This of course is the familiar constitutional standard of "rea-
sonableness" which due process demands of all legislation.32 In the
instant problem, except as noted above, there is little serious contro-
versy over this requirement. The cyclists themselves concede that
the method chosen, requiring helmets, promotes valid legislative
goals of minimizing personal injury and enhancing safety.33 And
undoubtedly, it meets the standard usually employed in such cases,
i.e., where ". . . 'debatable questions as to reasonableness are not
for the courts, but for the Legislature' . . . .,,34 As to the first re-
29 A.M.A. Brief in Davids at 3, Amicus Brief in Everhardt at 3.
30 Barbier v. Connolly, 113 US. 27, 31 (18851, Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 658
(1887).
31 Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136-37 (1894), described in Goldblatt v. Hemp-
stead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) as the "classic statement of the rule" of "reasonableness,"
although "even this rule is not applied with strict precision." Id. at 594, 595.
32 Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
33 A.M.A. Brief in Davids at 4.
34 Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 595 (1962) [Citation omitted]. See also,
Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
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quirement, however, legislative compliance is not altogether certain.
It is this aspect on which the debate focuses.
As stated previously, the express purpose of the helmet statutes
is self-protection of the individual from potential injury;35 that is to
say, the effect intended is to compel each cyclist to take precaution-
ary measures which reduce the risk of possible harm to himself. If
this is admittedly the sole purpose and effect of the regulation, then
how, the cyclists ask, does it appear that "the interests of the public
generally .. . require such interference"36 with their conduct? They
question not the legislative prerogative of determining what the pub-
lic needs, but only the authority to act when the public does not
need it. Thus, according to their view, it is essential for the govern-
ment to establish that other members of the public at large are af-
fected in some deleterious manner by a prospective defendant's ac-
tivity before that activity may be regulated. In other words, the ex-
istence of an ascertainable public need for a particular statute is a
mandatory precondition to the exercise of the police power. And,
indeed, the classic statement on the subject does seem to imply such
a requirement. Hence, in these cases, the issue should be framed in
terms of how the non-cyclist is affected by the cyclist's failure to com-
ply with the statute. Only if the non-cyclist is affected, say the cy-
clists, is there a public evil to regulate; without it, the legislature
has no power to act.
At this juncture, one may well wonder how novel this claim
really is, and how much it differs from the "reasonableness" standard
traditionally employed. It must be acknowledged that "reasonable-
ness" is a comprehensive label for various techniques. Without at-
tempting to delve into an extensive review of the subject, a brief
synopsis on the origin of the cyclists' theory and a few examples of
its connection to the present standard may suffice to illustrate just
how flexible that term can be.
The cyclists' thesis is not new. It is one of those ideas which is
deeply ". . . rooted in the traditions and conscience of the [English
speaking] people. .... ,,37 It originated in the political theory of the
social compact, an idea widely embraced by the Founding Fathers. 8
35 See text accompanying notes 22 and 26, supra.
36 See cases cited note 31, supra.
37 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 US. 97, 105 (1934). See also, Adamson v. Cali-
fornia, 332 U.S. 46 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165 (1952).
38 See, MacIver, European Doctrines and the Constitution, and Bainton, The
Appeal to Reason and the American Constitution, in THE CoNsnrr-roN RECoNsmRE
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"Natural man," in forming an organized society, was thought to have
relinquished some of his naturally endowed, individual rights for
the common good. In doing so, he still retained certain "inalienable
rights:" those unessential for the common weal and those indispens-
able to "liberty" as the 18th century thinkers viewed it. These rights
were immune from governmental interference.3 9 Many of them were
to become indelibly inscribed in the federal and state constitutions. 40
The subsequent fate of this idea, as a theory of government, is
familiar constitutional history. From Lochner v. New York 41 in 1905
to Nebbia v. New York 42 in 1934, the Supreme Court frequently
used the doctrine of "natural justice" to substitute its own views for
that of Congress and the state assemblies.4 3 The widespread reaction
against the Supreme Court in the early depression for invalidating
New Deal legislation completely discredited this concept in consti-
tutional adjudication.44 After Griswold v. Connecticut,45 which pre-
sages a possible revival, its future has become uncertain.46
This article purports to be neither a call for the revival of natural
justice, nor, obviously, an extensive review of the doctrine of the
social compact. Suffice it to say, however, the argument seems partic-
ularly appropriate in the factual context of this litigation. Citing the
51, 121 (Read ed. 1938); Hogan, The Supreme Court and Natural Law, 54 A.BA.J. 570
(1968) [Hereinafter cited as Hogan, 54 A.B.A.J. 570]; Convin, The "Higher Law"
Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HA.v. L. REv. 865, 380-409 (1929);
Van Loan, Natural Rights and the Ninth Amendment, 48 B.U.L. Rxv. 1 (1968) [Here-
inafter cited as Van Loan, 48 B.U.L. REv. 1]. See also, Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 386, 387-88 (1798) (Chase, J.) for an early judicial expression of this view.
39 See authorities cited note 38, supra.
40 See authorities cited note 38, supra. See generally Ratner, The Function of the
Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1048 (1968). [Hereinafter cited as Ratner, 116
U. PA. L. Rxv. 1048].
41 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
42 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
43 WRiGHT, THE GRowTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITTONAL LAiW 154 (1942).
44 McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and
Reburial 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 34, 36-40; Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine,
64 Mica. L. Rrv. 219, 223-25 (1965) [Hereinafter cited as Emerson, 64 Micr. L. Rxv.
219]; Hogan, 54 A.BA.J. 570, 571; Ratner, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1048, 1050-75.
45 381 US. 479 (1965).
46 Compare Emerson, 64 MICH. L. REv. 219, and Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra:
Constitutional Charter for an Expanded Law of Privacy? 64 Mica. L. REv. 197 (1965)
[Hereinafter cited as Dixon, 64 Mica. L. REv. 197] with Kauper, Penumbras, Periph-
eries, Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64
Mica. L. REv. 235 (1965) [Hereinafter cited as Kauper, 64 Mica. L. Ray. 235]. See
generally, Ratner 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1048, 1050-75.
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ancient maxim of the civil law, sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas,47
and relying mainly on the works of John Stuart Mill,4 8 the cyclists
contend that since the individual conduct proscribed-not wearing
a helmet-could not possibly harm another in any immediate, real-
istic manner, then the cyclist should be free to act according to his
own discretion and to select his own protective apparel. At a mini-
mum, there ought to be some limit on governmental power to in-
tervene into a person's affairs, under the guise of promoting the
"general welfare," when no one else is really threatened thereby.
And this should 'be so, notwithstanding the absence of any specifi-
cally enumerated constitutional prohibition. The idea almost seems
to paraphrase Justice Chase's opinion in Calder v. Bull. 49 Yet it ap-
pears much more persuasive here than in the economic Due Process
cases. In many of the latter, the pre-Nebbia court failed to fully ap-
preciate the nature of the injury to others. Given the economic views
of that era, those justices were unable to accept the rationale behind
unionism and collective bargaining; they were unable to appreciate
the impact that one employee's wages or working conditions could
have on another's. And perhaps they had other reasons. By contrast,
the direct effect on the public at large when an unhelmeted rider
takes to the highway is not so readily apparent, as will become evi-
dent. In any event, it must be noted that there was, at one time, con-
siderable judicial support for the position urged by the cyclists.
The history of due process is important not only in showing the
theoretical basis for the cyclists claim, but also in understanding the
varied techniques encompassed by that doctrine. The following three
illustrations may demonstrate its flexibility.
47 "So use your own as not to injure that of another" 39 WORDS AND PHRASFS 335-
338 (West ed. 1953).
48 J. MILL, UTILITARIANISm, LIBERTY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMIENT 131-149
(E.P. Dutton & Co. ed. 1925); sample:
As soon as any part of a person's conduct affects prejudicially the interests
of others, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the general
welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering with it, becomes open
to discussion. But there is no room for entertaining any such question when
a person's conduct affects the interests of no persons besides himself, or needs
not affect them unless they like (all the persons concerned being of full age,
and the ordinary amount of understanding). In all such cases, there should
be perfect freedom, legal and social, to do the action and stand the conse-
quences.
Id. at 132.
49 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387-88 (1798). See also, FREUND, THE PoLaCE PowER, PUBLIC
PoLIcY, AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS § 155 at 141-43 (1904 ed.).
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For one, when the penalties imposed by a statute are severe and
the policy being advanced is dubious or interferes with protected
liberties, the courts often switch to the "performance" standard in-
timated in United States v. Caroline Products Co.5 ° In these in-
stances, the government must show a "compelling interest" in the
policy, and must demonstrate that a "less drastic" means of achieving
its objective is unavailable.51 This technique is also routinely ap-
plied in zoning cases. 52 But no suggestion has been made that such
a technique would be appropriate here.
Also, whether courts are willing to acknowledge it or not, the
"reasonableness" standard is still infrequently employed to invali-
date the policy itself. The most recent publicized example of this
was Griswold v. Connecticut." However one may view the basis for
that decision, this element was certainly an important consideration
in each of the Griswold opinions.54 What is pertinent about Gris-
wold here, however, is that few believed that the proscribed conduct
-contraception-represented a public evil at all; on the contrary,
it was an important individual and social benefit, one to be encour-
aged rather than suppressed.55 No such sentiment is involved in the
helmet cases. Few would seriously doubt the desirability of wearing
a helmet and goggles while riding a motorcycle. The American Mo-
torcycle Association even requires them in its own events. 6 The
sole question is one of legislative power to require it.
Finally, another subject within the ambit of the "reasonable-
ness" doctrine is that of "special legislation." This term refers to
laws whose classifications are so narrowly circumscribed as to limit
50 304 U.S. 144, 152-153, n.4 (1938).
51 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 507-511 (1964) and cases cited;
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (Goldberg J., concurring) and cases cited.
52 Compare Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) with Nectow v. Cam-
bridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), rendered only 2 years after the famous decision in Euclid.
The Supreme Court has generally left this task to the states, and has heard only one
zoning case since Nectow, i.e., Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
53 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
54 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965) (Black and Stewart JJ.,
dissenting); Emerson, 64 Micir. L. Rrv. 219.
55 Emerson, 64 MicH. L. R-v. 219, n.2. The author (one of appellants' counsel)
notes that the Roman Catholic Church did not oppose invalidation of Connecticut's
birth-control statute; he also suggests that many members of the Connecticut legislature
favored repeal but preferred to have the Supreme Court, rather than themselves, per-
form that task. See also McKay, Right of Privacy: Emanations and Intimations, 64
Micff. L. Rav. 259, 280-281.
66 Amicus Brief in Everhardt at 1.
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their applicability to one particular company within a regulated in-
dustry, or one city within a state, etc. 57 "Special legislation" was a
common 19th century legislative device for dispensing with govern-
mental privileges or for pursuing other constitutionally questionable
objectives.58 Today, most states have constitutional provisions which
require all laws to have a "general operation," thereby prohibiting
most forms of "special legislation." 59 Still, one of the underlying
values behind the "means-ends" test is the elucidation and exposure
of the specific goal being advanced. If the methodology of a statute
is found to be promoting the interests of a particular class, as distin-
guished from those of the public generally, then, having failed to
meet the rationality test, the goal is adjudged an impermissible one.60
The equal protection clause is usually used to invalidate an arbitrary
classification, but ". . . discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to
be violative of due process."6' This is in effect what the cyclists are
asserting, but in a slightly variant form. Thus, it must be recognized
at the outset that the approach suggested by the cyclists is not really
novel, nor radically different from that traditionally employed in
constitutional litigation.
But perhaps there is a difference. It may be but a difference in
degree or in emphasis. The first courts which entertained this argu-
ment so viewed it.62 As should become evident later, the argument does
tend to accentuate the factual bases behind a regulatory measure in
lieu of the nebulous assertions often made in comparable cases. It
also tends to illuminate the interests that are really at stake in un-
familiar subjects, thus giving more specific content to the rationality
test. Presumably, all legislative and executive action must promote
57 WINTES, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LImrTATIONS ON SOLUTIONS OF METROPOLrrAN
APEA PROBLIMS 83-84 (1961).
GS Anderson v. Board of Commissioners, 77 Kan. 721, 95 p. 583 (1908), and cases
cited; Winters, note 57, supra.
59 Winters, note 57, supra, at 84-86. E.g., IND. CONsT. ART. IV, § 23, "... in all
other cases where a general law can be made applicable, all laws shall be general, and
of uniform operation throughout the state."
60 Compare Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. (83 U.S.) 36 (1873) and Walnut Creek
v. Silveira, 47 Cal. 2d 804, 306 P.2d 453 (1957), with Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
81 Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). The relationship between due
process and equal protection has only recently been articulated. Note, Scope of the
Right to Aid Other Than Counsel, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 984, 986-93 (1968) and cases cited;
Van Loan, 48 B.U.L. REv. 1, 32-33.
62 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887); Territory v. Ah Lim, 1 Wash. 156, 24
P. 588 (1890). These are perhaps the only cases which fully treat the question as pre-
sented in the helmet cases.
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broad social purposes. Once courts focus on the injury to others re-
sulting from the prohibited conduct, they will more readily perceive
the social need for such a measure. If none is readily apparent and
cannot be adequately demonstrated, then the governmental action
must be "irrational" or otherwise impermissible. Hence, the ap-
proach suggested, although perhaps but a restatement of the tradi-
tional reasonableness test, is a most useful one in this type of litiga-
tion. The matter deserves consideration. Therefore, in order to fully
appreciate the cyclists' claim, the non-cycling public's need for the
helmet law must first be identified.
B. The "Missile Hazard" Theory
A number of courts, it must be acknowledged, have ruled on the
basis of an alleged direct benefit to the public. They have asserted
that other motorists are affected by the statutes' operation. The Su-
preme Court of Rhode Island, in a brief opinion, upheld that state's
helmet law on such a ground.
It does not tax the intellect to comprehend that loose stones on
the highway kicked up by passing vehicles, or fallen objects such
as windblown free branches, against which the operator of a
closed vehicle has some protection, could so affect the operator
of a motorcycle as to cause him momentarily to lose control and
thus become a menace to other vehicles on the highway.63
Other than applying the presumption of constitutionality, this was
the extent of its analysis. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts followed this rationale without further elaboration. 4 In Ever-
hardt v. New Orleans,65 the Louisiana Supreme Court, in a more
extensive review of the problem, cited this reasoning with approval.
A slight variation on the same theme was put forth by a New York
trial court.
The old joke about the happy motorcyclist-"the one with
the bugs on his teeth"-is not too funny when one hears or reads
about instances where cyclists have been hit with hard-shelled
beetles or bees and have lost control of their bikes, causing
damage and injuries to others.66
If this factual assessment comes to be accepted by those who consider
it, then of course, it is dispositive of the matter, having removed the
63 State ex rel. Colvin v. Lombardi, - R.I. -, 241 A.2d 625, 627 (1968).
64 Commonwealth v. Howie, - Mass. -, 238 NXE.2d 373, cert. denied, 89 Sup. Ct.
485 (1968).
65 - La. -, 217 So. 2d 400 (1968).
66 People v. Bielmeyer, 54 Misc. 2d 466, 469, 282 N.Y.S.2d 797, 800 (1967).
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very foundation on which the cyclists' argument rests. As an ap-
proach to dealing with other self-protective laws, however, it has
several inherent weaknesses, some of which should be mentioned.
One difficulty with the above rationale is that it lacks cogency.
The cyclists simply do not believe it; they consider it patently un-
realistic. 67 They point out that it represents nothing more than judi-
cial notice of a subject about which most judges have little knowl-
edge or experience. They also note that those who proposed the hel-
met had never intended any other effect but the stated one-self
protection. If the legislatures had this purpose in mind when the
requirement was enacted, they definitely omitted any reference to
it in their materials. Further, if the legislature was really concerned
about the deflection of "missile hazards," i.e., insects, wind-carried
debris, etc., then logically they misconceived their remedy. Goggles
would have been a far more obvious and effective deterrent against
flying objects than the helmets, yet only a third of the states have in-
cluded a face shield requirement. 8 Also compare the rebuttal of-
fered by Judge Barham in Everhardt v. New Orleans:
I cannot determine how the wearing of a helmet by a motor-
cyclist can be conducive to the safer operation of his motorcycle.
He is as accident-prone with as without the helmet in regard
both to himself and to other motorists. Certainly an unhelmeted
motorcyclist presents no increased danger to the rest of the
motoring public. The most that can be said to support the in-
sistence upon the wearing of the helmet is ... [the] conclusion
that the helmet may mitigate the cyclist's injury after the fact,
after the accident, after the breach of safety.
[I]t is reasoned that because of less body protection motor-
cyclists are "more susceptible to be injured and cause other in-juries." Only the assumption that they are more susceptible to
injury has validity in my mind and then not to a certainty. The
assumption that the motorcyclist's lack of body protection makes
other highway users more likely to be injured appears to be
without foundation or logic. I can find no basis for concluding
that helmeting or even armouring our motorcyclists would cause
fewer injuries to others. [Emphasis added.]
The ordinance is simply an attempt to force one class of
67 A.M.A. Brief in Davids, Reply Brief, at 4.
68 See, note 20, supra. The court in Davids pointed out that a "... windshield
requirement imposed on the manufacturer would bear a reasonable relationship to
the objective [if missile hazards were really the objective] and not vary from the norm
of safety legislation customarily imposed on the manufacturer for the protection of
the public. . ." American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, 158 N.W.2d 72, 75 (Mich. App.
1968).
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persons to mitigate or minimize their own injuries resulting from
accident without regard to causation of the accident or general
highway safety. 69
Hence, as a factual matter, the "missile hazard" theory does not ap-
pear to be an overly persuasive application of the "reasonableness"
standard, regardless of one's view of that test. Unless some factual
evidence supporting this view can be obtained, it must be character-
ized as a ". . strained effort to justify what is admittedly wholesome
legislation." 70
Moreover, this type of safety measure has few analogues. Most
traffic laws are primarily designed to keep one person from hurting
another: if one drives at an excessive speed, he may lose control and
collide with another motorist, or he may not be capable of stopping
in time to avoid a pedestrian in a cross walk; if he runs through a
red light, a similar fate may befall him. Thus experience tells the
person subject to these laws that obedience minimizes the risk of
harm to all road users. In addition, most other types of safety regu-
lations, the "public welfare offenses," are usually directed at the
manufacturer, seller, and employer for the protection of others, i.e.,
the consumer, the worker, and the public at large.7 1 Although now
enforced by means of criminal sanctions, many of these offenses were
long ago recognized as tortious conduct and were indirectly deterred
by means of strict civil liability.72 Consequently, these too are well
understood and appreciated by those to whom they apply. Even in
69 Everhardt v. New Orleans, - La. -, 217 So. 2d 400, 404 (1968) (Barham, J.,
dissenting).
70 American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, 158 N.W.2d 72, 75 (Mich. App. 1963).
71 Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) eloquently described these laws
as follows:
The industrial revolution multiplied the number of workmen exposed to in-
jury from increasingly powerful and complex mechanisms, driven by freshly
discovered sources of energy, requiring higher precautions by employers.
Traffic of velocities, volumes and varieties unheard of came to subject the
wayfarer to intolerable casualty risks if owners and drivers were not to ob-
serve new cares and uniformities of conduct. Congestion of cities and crowding
of quarters called for health and welfare regulations undreamed of in simpler
times. Wide distribution of goods became an instrument of wide distribution
of harm when those who dispersed goods, drink, drugs, and even securities,
did not comply with reasonable standards of quality, integrity, disclosure and
care. Such dangers have engendered increasingly numerous and detailed regu-
lations which heighten the duties of those in control of particular industries,
trades, properties or activities that affect public health, safety or welfare.
Id. at 253-254.
72 Id.
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the closely related area of health regulations, where the one on whom
the onus is laid is forced into taking self-protective action, the bene-
fit to others is readily perceptible. For example, in Zucht v. King,73
the complainant had been ordered to submit to a compulsory vacr
cination in order to remain in school. Without such an inoculation,
both she and the other students might be susceptible to infection,
owing to the contagious nature of small-pox. Numerous other exam-
ples could be cited. But in the helmet cases, unlike the above, the
onus falls on the only one ostensibly benefited by the statute's en-
forcement. Hence, if there is an indirect, but nonetheless identifi-
able public interest involved, then it ought to be clarified for him
to whom the statute applies.
III. THE INTERESTS OF THE STATE
When the states have actually been called upon to demonstrate
the harm to the public at large, they have been hard pressed to ade-
quately respond. Most have merely emphasized the broad, inherent
powers of the legislature and the applicability of the presumption of
constitutionality. Some have contended that driving on a public
thoroughfare is only a "privilege," not a "right," and therefore the
legislature should have more latitude in prescribing appropriate
rules. 74 While this is undoubtedly true as a general matter, it really
does not answer the question, as the cyclists have framed it. Further,
no state has contended that traffic regulations are exempt from due
process requirements. In addition, a few states have asserted that li-
ability insurance rates would increase without the statute, as per-
sonal injuries tend to be more severe.75 The short answer to this,
though, is that the defense of contributory negligence is always avail-
able to a tortfeasor charged with hitting a cyclist. Also, since there
are many, varied actuarial factors which contribute to the cost of li-
ability insurance, the "helmet factor" would hardly be a significant
cost item to most non-cycling, insured motorists. 76 In sum, none of
these assertions really identify any interest that the statutes serves.
Of all the arguments put forward by the state, only two appear
to have any realistic content: (1) the asserted interest in the "viabil-
73 260 U.S. 174 (1922).
74 Everhardt v. New Orleans, - La. -, 217 So. 2d 400 (1968).
75 Brief for Defendants and Appellees at 8, American Motorcyle Ass'n v. Davids,
158 N.W.2d 72 (Mich. App. 1968) [Hereinafter cited as State's Brief in Davids]; State
v. Anderson, 164 S.E.2d 48, 51 (N.C. App. 1968).
76 Cf. data presented in note 78, infra.
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ity" of the citizen 77 and (2) the interest in solving any "alarming"
problem which reaches such "grave dimensions" that it threatens
the very fabric of society. Both of these claims are really facets or
restatements of the same thing-the interest of the public in its own
preservation and productivity. Few would disagree with this as a
general matter. All laws are presumably directed toward this goal.
The difficulty, though, arises when one attempts to use it as a justifi-
cation for a specific law. It becomes an exceedingly complex argu-
ment, so much so that it has rarely been made. Notwithstanding the
difficulties, the merits of this contention need to be explored in
some detail, especially since it has been urged as a ground for up-
holding the helmet law.
A. The Welfare Cost Approach
Like the liability insurance rate argument mentioned earlier,
this approach is based on welfare costs. When a cyclist suffers a dis-
abling head injury, his ability to support himself is markedly dimin-
ished and he therefore becomes a burden on the state. He not only
ceases to contribute to the resources of the state, but he also becomes
another addition to the already overloaded welfare rolls. And in an
era of great public clamor over the high costs of public welfare, the
inferences one may draw to jump to this conclusion are practically
irresistible. But the logical validity of these inferences ought to be
scrutinized further, and, to do this, the proposition should be phrased
in quasi-syllogistic form. Thus the proposition may be stated: any
measure, or most measures, which tend to reduce welfare costs are,
unless specifically prohibited, justifiable exercises of the police power;
the helmet requirement does reduce these costs and therefore it must
be valid. As a practical matter, the assertion rests on rather uncer-
tain grounds.
For one, many who ride motorcycles are probably more than
capable of financing their own rehabilitation; yet they are neither
exempt from the statute's application, nor are they likely to become
welfare recipients. Also, proof of medical insurance as a prerequisite
to registering a motorcycle could be an alternative, more acceptable,
77 State's Brief in Davids at 5-7; State v. Mele, 103 N.J. Super. 353, 247 A.2d 176
(1968); See also, suggestion in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, (1937):
The State still retains an interest in his welfare, however reckless he may be.
The whole is no greater than the sum of all the parts, and when the indi-
vidual health, safety and welfare are sacrificed or neglected, the State must
suffer.
Id. at 394.
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way of dealing with the problem. Further, no one has yet to exhibit
data which suggests that injured cyclists significantly add to the wel-
fare rolls. True, cycling is more dangerous than automobile driving,
but it probably does not affect welfare costs so out of proportion to
the numbers involved that special coercive regulation is needed. Thus,
a limiting feature of this argument is that all human activity in-
creases the danger of physical harm to the individual; however, only
a relatively few who are actually disabled ever end up on welfare.7 8
Most welfare costs stem from other far more serious social problems.
Perhaps only when the percentage of welfare recipients attributable
to those actually disabled in cycling accidents reaches "alarming"
proportions will this be a very persuasive justification for the helmet
requirement.
A more serious disadvantage of this argument is that it knows
no bounds. It can be used to justify almost anything. All laws are
passed to "preserve the state," even unconstitutional ones. To say
that those entrusted with the government of the states were actually
worried about the number of gainfully employed carpenters, lab
technicians, salesmen, etc., and therefore passed this specific statute
proves to be a little too much. The same justification has been used
for many years to uphold vagrancy laws and other like measures.79
And, as many courts and commentators have amply demonstrated,
this argument is really a euphemistic facade for other, unstated rea-
sons. 0 If the legislators were seriously concerned about labor short-
ages, then all the public discourse on overpopulation, birth control,
and unemployment is grossly misconceived. This is not to dispute
78 Of the 10,800,000 accidental injuries (total disabilities) which occurred in 1966,
the last date for which figures are available, only 400,000 resulted in "permanent im-
pairments"; of these 400,000, 160,000 were attributed to motor vehicle accidents. Since
motor vehicles outnumber motorcycles about 45 to 1 (90 million to 2 million) probably
no more than 4,000 "permanent" disabilities per year occur as a result of motorcycle
accidents; hence, this cannot be a significant contributing factor in welfare costs. World
Almanac 895 (Newspaper Enterprise Ass'n Inc., ed. 1968) (Statistics compiled by U.S.
Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare) [Hereinafter cited as 1968 World Almanac].
See also, note 103, infra.
70 See, Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 603
(1965); Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional Restrictions on the Punishment of Crimes
of Status, etc., 3 Cpiar. L. Bur.. 205 (1967); Fenster v. Leary, 20 N.Y.2d 309, 299 N.E.2d
426, 282 N.Y.S.2d 739 (1967).
8D E.g., see, Advisory Committee Comments to MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.725 (Vol.
40A, at 68, 1964) (conclusion: "This is undoubtedly a crude device for getting at a
very deep social problem and consists of little more than attempts at repression rather
than solution." Id. at 69). See also, materials cited, note 79, supra.
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the salutory effect of the helmet requirement or impugn legislative
motives; it is to say, though, that the "effect on welfare" argument
is far too remote a public benefit to justify the application of crim-
inal sanctions to this particular activity.
B. The "Analogical" Approach
This approach, called the "analogical" one for lack of a better
term, is a traditional legal process for evaluating an unfamiliar sub-
ject. Relying heavily on this method, the states have cited several
statutes which appear to have the same effect as the helmet require-
ment and which have consistently been sustained. These statutes de-
serve some comment.
Anti-suicide statutes in particular are cited as an example of a
comparable law.1 The state, so the contention runs, has such a high
regard for human life that it will not suffer one to take his own. If
a person attempts to kill himself but does not succeed, he is crim-
inally liable. No other person is directly benefited by the operation
of such statute, yet it is regularly upheld without debate. Thus, since
there is no material difference between such statutes and the helmet
requirement, a fortiori, the latter must be valid. Suicide laws, how-
ever, are hardly a stable basis for justifying this legislation. The the-
sis is untested. Very few cases, in point, have arisen in recent years.8 2
Most references to anti-suicide statutes are either dicta or oblique
assertions made by insurance companies attempting to invoke their
suicide clauses.8 3 The only recent cases which have considered the
issue rely solely on 19th century precedent, wherein appear state-
ments such as: "suicide is malum in se"; 14 "[s]elf-destruction is
against the law of God and man."8' 5 They hardly represent the pene-
trating analyses called for in today's secular world. Moreover, the
81 E.g., State's Brief in Davids at 10.
82 Basically, with a few exceptions, the cases in notes 83-86 infra are the only
reported cases on suicide laws.
83 E.g., Commonwealth v. Root, 191 Pa. Super. 238, 156 A.2d 895 (1959); Appli-
cation of the President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1,000
(D.C. Cir. 1964), rehearing denied en banc. 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Aetna Life
Ins. Co. v. McLaughlin, 370 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); Liberty National Life
Ins. Co. v. Cox, 98 Ga. App. 582, 106 S.E.2d 182 (1958).
84 State v. Willis, 255 N.C. 473, 475, 121 S.E.2d 854, 855 (1961). The court in
Willis reviews the authorities, and concludes that, since attempted suicide was a crime
at common law, and since the legislature had declared the common law in force in
that state, suicide could be punished.
85 Wallace v. State, 232 Ind. 700, 701, 116 N.E.2d 100, 101 (1953). Note that this
was the extent of the court's analysis.
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cyclists could point to the fact that a significant number of states
have refused to enact such statutes and for the very reason which the
cyclists advocate.86 Hence, a state is better off omitting this analogy.
Other comparable situations are frequently mentioned: auto
seat belts, smoking, athletic activities, and the like. For example, in
Hutchinson v. Silvey,87 the court notes that a number of states have
enacted laws which require the installation of seat belts in auto-
mobiles and which prohibit the operation of any vehicle not so
equipped. It also cites several articles which argue that the failure
to wear seat belts ought to be recognized as contributory negligence
so as to prevent the plaintiff's recovery after an accident. From this,
it concludes that "[s]uch principles might well apply to failure to
wear a crash helmet while operating motorcycles."88 Similar examples
might be cited, but this one suffices to illustrate the main disadvan-
tage of this group. They are untested. The similarities may prove to
be illusory. The seat-belt example, for instance, appears to be more
akin to a "public welfare offense" than the helmet requirement, as,
in the former, the main burden is placed on the manufacturer rather
than on the user. Different considerations apply. The cyclists them-
selves, for example, have tried to reinforce their position with the
contention that the helmet requirement is, in effect, no different
from a prohibition on smoking. While this analogy may suggest some
of the implications of the helmet ruling as precedent, it too has never
been subjected to judicial scrutiny. As a result, many of these argu-
ments amount to little more than mere assertions and counterasser-
tions.
Although seldom cited, certain "morality" laws, such as those
prohibiting adultery, fornication, consensual homosexuality, and the
like, are analogous in some respects. Except for Griswold v. Connec-
ticut 9 and Cotner v. Henry,90 these offenses are usually upheld with-
out much discussion. Yet the same problem of ascertaining just how
the public is harmed by the proscribed activity obtains here. That is
to say, it is very difficult to perceive or appreciate how other mem-
bers of society are threatened in any direct or material sense by the
actors' conduct. Although these offenses are subjects of treatises in
86 See, Annot., 92 A.L.R. 1180 (1934); Tate v. Canconica 180 Cal. App. 2d 898, 5
Cal. Rptr. 28 (1960).
87 No. CR 8081 (Dist. Ct. of Reno County, Kan., Dec. 11, 1967)
88 Id.
89 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
90 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1968).
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themselves, observations contained in the commentary to the Model
Penal Code are relevant in this regard and are worth repeating.
Sexual intercourse outside the bounds of lawful matrimony is
widely, but not universally, criminal in the United States. The
law is directly traceable to Biblical and other religious sources.
• [But] [t]he Code does not attempt to use the power of
the state to enforce purely moral or religious standards. We deem
it inappropriate for the government to attempt to control be-
havior that has no substantial significance except as to the moral-
ity of the actor.
... Our proposal to exclude from the criminal law all sexual
practices not involving force, adult corruption of minors, or
public offense is based on the following grounds. No harm to the
secular interests of the community is involved in atypical sex
practice in private between consenting adult partners. This area
of private morals is the distinctive concern of spiritual authori-
ties.... Further, there is the fundamental question of the pro-
tection to which every individual is entitled against state inter-
ference in his personal affairs when he is not hurting others.
[Emphasis added.]91
As a consequence of this salient, and due to the complexity of this
subject-matter, the states themselves have been reluctant to use these
offenses as support for their view.
C. A Possible Justification for the Helmet Requirement
Despite the weaknesses in the position taken by the states, the
fact remains that the aforementioned casualty rates may have reached
"alarming" proportions. Congress and the states obviously so con-
sidered them. However, it must be noted that Congress and the
states were primarily concerned with the overall annual figures and
not with this specific requirement. 2 In fact, no specific reference to
motorcycles can be found in the legislative materials in the 1966 fed-
eral safety laws. Also, these legislative bodies were primarily inter-
ested in establishing a comprehensive nationwide safety program,
particularly in the areas of driver training, vehicle equipment and
inspections, research, and so forth.93 They were not considering spe-
cific standards.9 4 It might also be noted that most of this legislation,
like the public welfare offenses cited above, is ultimately directed at
91 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207, Comment, at 204, 207, 277-278 (Tent. Draft No. 4,
1955). [Cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 89 S. Ct. 1248 (1969)-Ed.]
92 Fed. Safety Acts of 1966, CCH REP. 1, 9.
93 See, 23 US.C.A. § 402(a) (Supp. 1967).
94 Fed. Safety Acts of 1966, CCH REP. 4.
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either the manufacturer or the distributor, not the individual. 5 An
exception to this perhaps is mandatory driver education,96 but here
the relation between the regulation and the public benefit is self-
evident. If the individual is not qualified to drive, he is much more
likely to collide with and injure others. Thus, it cannot be said that
there is a strong federal policy behind this particular requirement.
As far as the states are concerned, though, this may be another mat-
ter.
Several of the states do appear to view motorcycle injuries as a
very serious problem. The Michigan legislature, after its original
helmet statute was invalidated in American Motorcycle Association
v. Davids,7 reenacted a law which required all motorcycles to be
".... equipped with, and carry when.., being operated, a number
of crash helmets equal to the number of drivers and passengers car-
ried .... ,,98 Thus, it in effect overruled the Davids decision. New
York has also acted further in this area by prescribing detailed regu-
lations on construction and equipment.99 It is difficult to ascertain
whether the other states feel likewise or whether they are merely
complying with the federal standard.100 Notwithstanding, it is prob-
ably accurate to say that the helmet requirement does represent a
fairly important state policy. The subject discussed herein, however,
is not so much on the importance of the policy, but on how the
courts ought to treat it. For this is the significance of the helmet
litigation.
When confronted with a statute of this sort, i.e., a self-protec-
tive law, the court at least ought to deal with the legislative reasons
suggested by the statute's drafters. If the statistics presented demon-
strate the "grave dimensions" of the problem to be remedied, then
the court ought to rule on that basis alone. If it is shown that a size-
able portion of the younger generation is being disabled by severe
head injuries resulting from motorcycle accidents, then perhaps the
state should prevail. But in so ruling, the court ought to realistically
consider all the interests involved and the possible implications of
the decision. Little is gained by invoking improbable "reasons" like
95 See, National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966, 80 Stat. 718, 722,
724 (§ 108, 111) (1966).
0 Fed. Safety Acts of 1966, CH REP. 4.
OT 158 N.W.2d 72 (Mich. App. 1968).
98 MicH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 257.658(d) (Supp. 1968) (amended June 12, 1968,
by Pub. Act No. 141, 3 Mich. Legislative Service 248, 1968).
OD N.Y. VEH. 8: TR". LAW § 281(10) (McKinney Supp. 1968-69).
100 E.g., see note 19, supra.
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the "missile hazard" theory or by a rote recital of the litany on the
presumption of constitutionality. If a fresh doctrinal basis is needed
to justify the measure, then it ought to be proposed. And the helmet
cases may have provided such an opportunity.
A possible basis for upholding this law may be found in the
tort law concept of "public necessity." Prosser defines this as a case
"[w]here the danger affects the entire community, or so many peo-
ple that the public interest is involved, that interest serves as a com-
plete justification to the defendant who acts to avert the peril to
all."'1 1 One helmet decision suggested this as a possible ground, even
though it rested on the presumption.
Death on the highway can no longer be considered as a personal
and individual tragedy alone. The mounting carnage has long
since reached proportions of a public disaster. Legislation rea-
sonably designed to reduce the toll may for that reason alone be
sufficiently imbued with the public interests to meet the consti-
tutional test required for a valid exercise of the State's police
power. 02
Unfortunately, except as noted, sufficient data to properly evaluate
the seriousness of the helmet problem is apparently not available
in the legislative materials; 0 3 the figures are not classified into dis-
tinct categories. Based on the information given, however, it is prob-
able that fatalities attributed to motorcycles are about 2,500 per
year, 0 4 with an annual increase of 50% anticipated. Although this
figure is comparable to accidental deaths caused by firearms, machin-
101 Prosser, Law of Torts § 24 at 127 (3d ed. 1964) (examples given: "Thus one
who dynamites a house to stop the spread of a conflagration that threatens a
town .... or, in time of war, destroys property which should not be allowed to fall
into hands of the enemy, is not liable to the owner, so long as the emergency is great
enough, and he has acted reasonably under the circumstances." Id. at 127-28).
102 State v. Anderson, 164 S.E.2d 48, 50 (N.C. App. 1968).
103 See, 23 U.S.C.A. § 402(a) (Supp. 1967); Fed. Safety Acts of 1966, CCH REP.
4, suggesting that this lack of detailed information retards the development of high-
way safety generally and was therefore one of the goals of the act; cf. data cited in
note 25, supra, and 1968 World Almanac 895.
104 This estimate was determined by projecting the data given in the Michigan
Police summary, note 25, supra (Exhibit A to State's Brief in Davids) on a national
scale as follows: 11.5 per 10,000 registrations times 1,915,000 registrations nationally
(H.R. Doc. No. 138, 90-1 at 3), or about 2,200 fatalities; if the Michigan Police data for
all vehicles, 5.2 per 10,000 registrations, is multiplied by 90 million, the total number
of vehicle registrations in the U.S. (Fed. Safety Acts of 1966, CCH REP. 1) the
result is circa 47,000 which is roughly comparable to the actual national figure.
Thus, the 2,500 figure is reasonably accurate enough for illustrative purposes, and
places in its proper perspective the language used by the Secretary of Transportation
in his report.
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ery, and like hazards,105 it must be pointed out that the rates of in-
crease are radically different, i.e., the latter being fairly constant,10 6
while the former allegedly doubles every 2 years.10 7 Perhaps, all fac-
tors considered, this fact might be sufficient to characterize the prob-
lem as a "public disaster" of "grave dimensions." If so, then the stat-
ute ought to be upheld, but only on that basis. The same rationale
might apply to analogous situations. If so many people are injured
in skiing accidents as compared with other sports, then the legisla-
ture may be justified in taking appropriate action due to a "public
necessity." It is at least a more plausible basis for sustaining the reg-
ulation and it does tend to give some realistic content to the "viabil-
ity of the state" argument.
No doubt, the proposed "public necessity" exception to what
should otherwise be the general rule has some inherent limitations.
Many of the weaknesses of the "welfare costs" approach would seem-
ingly apply here. A court would have to decide at what point a "pub-
lic necessity" exists so that the exception replaces the rule and the
power to regulate attaches. Whether this point would be a fixed
amount, like 10,000 deaths and injuries or a fixed percentage of the
affected population, or a varying scale depending upon the subject
matter involved, would depend upon the facts in each case. Judges
are frequently compelled to draw such lines in order to prevent the
exceptions from engulfing a rule. Also there is a very difficult theo-
retical aspect to this proposal. It might be argued that, if the state
has no power to force a few cyclists to wear a helmet, how can that
power come into play once many decide to ride without a helmet.
Maybe in the long run this proposal has no validity. But at least,
with the possible rise of self-protective laws, the argument ought to
be explored.
IV. THE SIGNIFIcANcE OF THE HELMET LrIGATION
A. A More Workable Standard of "Reasonableness"
The brief comparisons made earlier between "morality" laws,
anti-suicide statutes, and the helmet requirement do illustrate a very
important point. They show the difficulty that a trial judge encoun-
ters when confronted with cases of this kind, particularly in clarify-
ing the nebulous assertions that are often made and in identifying
the interests that are ultimately at stake. Perhaps, the value to be de-
105 1968 World Almanac 895 (firearms 2600; machinery 2100, etc.).
106 Id.
107 See, note 22, supra, and accompanying text.
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rived from the helmet cases is the emphasis placed on the injury
which the public is alleged to suffer when laws of this type are chal-
lenged. The cyclists' argument tends to minimize the "battle of la-
bels." It tends to demand factual analysis similar to that called for
in Justice Hall's famous dissent in Vickers v. Township Committee
of Gloucester Township.
While it has long been conventional for courts to test the validity
of local legislation by the criterion of whether a fairly debatable
issue is presented, and if so to sustain it, it makes all the differ-
ence in the world how a court deals with that criterion. Properjudicial review to me can be nothing less than an objective,
realistic consideration of the setting-the evils or conditions
sought to be remedied, a full and comparative appraisal of the
public interest involved and the private rights affected, both
from the local and broader aspects, and a thorough weighing of
all factors, with government entitled to win if the scales are at
least balanced or even a little less so. Of course such a process
involves judgment and the measurement can never be mathema-
tically exact. But that is what judges are for-to evaluate and
protect all interests, including those of individuals and minori-
ties, regardless of personal likes or views of wisdom, and not
merely to rubber stamp governmental action in a kind of judi-
cial laissez-faire. The majority approach attaches exclusive sig-
nificance to the view of the governing body that, in its summary
opinion, the "welfare" of the municipality would be advanced.
On this criterion it is hard to conceive of any local action which
would not come within the "debatable" class. 108
Thus it may even lead to a more workable standard for dealing with
due process issues on a lower court level. A comparison of the helmet
requirement with the situation presented in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut'019 should serve to illustrate the point.
In commenting on the Griswold case, and on the ninth amend-
ment generally, many writers have urged the United States Supreme
Court to distinguish between "economic" and "personal" due pro-
cess cases. 110 But, as Justice Black has intimated, that distinction can
often be rather artificial."' A man's money, goods or job can be just
as "personal" to him as his privacy and pleasures, if not more so. Yet
as others have also pointed out, Black's "specific constitutional guar-
108 37 NJ. 232, 260, 181 A.2d 129, 144 (1962).
109 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
110 E.g., see, Emerson, 64 MicH. L. Rv. 219; Dixon, 64 MicH. L. REv. 197; Van
Loan, 48 B.U.L. Rxv. 1; Hogan, 54 A.B.A.J. 570. See also Ratner, 116 U. PA. L. Riv.
1048.
11 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 508-09 (1965) (Black J., dissenting).
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antees" are hardly more definite or easily applied than Harlan's
"fundamental fairness" or Douglas' "penumbral rights of privacy."" 2
Thus, it is no mean task for a trial court to determine whether the
claim asserted, as in the helmet cases, is "... . of the very essence of a
scheme of ordered liberty. ."'Is or is included within the ambit of
a "penumbral right." 114 These terms are conclusory and reflect only
the ultimate disposition of a given claim. They are not clear, accu-
rate tests to guide the lower courts in ruling on different though re-
lated claims." 5 But the emphasis on injury advocated by the cyclists
might provide such a test. If, for instance, a trial judge, when con-
fronted with a case like Griswold, were to focus on the problem of
how other Connecticut citizens might be affected by the conduct
proscribed, he might be able to perceive that no immediate, iden-
tifiable threat to their well-being could result from that conduct. If
he were then to require the state to demonstrate some substantial
benefit to the public at large by enforcement of the prohibition in-
volved, he might have some realistic basis for concluding that no
valid social purpose was promoted by the regulation.",, With such a
due process standard, he might be able to more accurately predict
what the result would be on appeal. Perhaps, if such an approach
had been taken in Griswold, it would have obviated the plethora of
opinions generated by that case.
In the helmet cases, the controversy does focus on the public
interest; in Griswold, this was assumed without consideration. Per-
haps, in a nation saturated with publicity on the connection between
individual family planning and societal well being, this specific could
hardly have loomed large in the dispute. Later analyses may well sug-
gest that such a relationship is less than obvious. In any event, to
properly apply the rationality test in its traditional form in the Gris-
wold situation is a very complex undertaking. A lower court must
embark on an extensive evaluation of medical evidence and sexual
practices to determine whether the "means" relates to the "ends"
sought. To some extent, it must also pass on the suitability of the
end itself, i.e., to decide whether or not it is a socially desirable one.
On the other hand, the emphasis on injury may obviate the need for
some of this. Compare, for example, the controversy in Tinker v.
112. Compare opinions of Douglas, Harlan, and Black, Id. See, Kauper, 64 MICH.
L. REv. 235, 255-58. See generally, Ratner, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1048.
113 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 825 (1937).
114 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
115 Ratner, 116 U. PA. L. Rrv. 1048, 1057.
116 Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE'S position in text accompanying note 91, supra.
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Des Moines Independent Community School District17 over the
wearing of a black armband in protest against the Viet Nam war. In
that case, the disputants concentrate primarily on the factual issue
of whether or not protest symbols actually disrupt classroom proce-
dure.118 This is a good application of the approach suggested. Thus,
it should become evident that many lower courts are unable to ade-
quately perform the complex task required of them by the tradi-
tional "reasonableness" test, especially in the type of cases herein
discussed. Often, they must of necessity apply the presumption of
constitutionality even though they might suspect that it is not ap-
plicable. It is suggested that the helmet litigation provides the op-
portunity to refine thinking in this area. The argument merits more
attention than has been given it.
B. Precedential Implications of the Helmet Decision
The helmet requirement seems to exemplify an increasing ten-
dency of modern governmental agencies to intervene into the minu-
tiae of human activity. The Tinker dispute over the wearing of black
armbands is a classic example. One cannot help but doubt the value
of spending time, money, and effort to resolve the question of
whether high school students may wear black armbands. Another
example is the case of People v. Stover."19 After almost three years of
legislation and litigation, it was finally decided that Rye, New York,
could keep an intractable but otherwise apparently harmless old
man from hanging rags on a clothesline in his own front yard. Many
of the situations discussed above also could be placed in this cate-
gory. There are many such cases.' 20
The approach suggested by the cyclists may provide a palatable
method of dealing with such issues. As intimated above, to punish
behavior that demonstrably affects no one might be viewed as a very
inefficient use of the criminal justice system. In the first place, it can-
not be gainsaid that this society attaches considerable importace to
recreational activities. One who might characterize the cyclists' com-
plaint as trivial might react otherwise to any curtailment of his fa-
vorite sport. Such laws tend to offend many people, and yet, by hy-
117 258 F. Supp. 971, aff'd per curiam by equally divided court, 383 F.2d 988
(8th Cir., 1967), cert. granted, 390 US. 942 (1968). [rev'd, 89 S. Ct. 733 (1969)-Ed.]
118 Briefs for Appellants and Appellee, Id.
119 12 N.Y.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, 240 N.Y.S.2d 734, app. dismissed, 375 U.S. 42
(1963). (Dr. Stover eventually served 30 days for this crime, N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1964,
at 46, col. 2.)
120 E.g., Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968); Reid v. Architectural Board of Review, 119 0. App.
67, 192 N.E2d 74 (1963).
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pothesis, they produce no corresponding benefit to others. Moreover,
the emotional fervor pervading the policies behind such laws often
tends to distort the issues and obfuscate interests that are really at
stake. The wearing of a helmet, for example, is a relative matter.
Most sensible individuals would wear one on a road trip, but de-
cline to do so on a short jaunt about the neighborhood. To the cy-
clists, such a decision should be left to his own discretion, not to
state law. In addition, the emphasis on such measures tends to com-
plicate the policeman's already complex job. With so many rules to
enforce, the law officer cannot help but concentrate on only those
infractions which he actually observes. And even after enforcement,
society has gained little thereby, when no demonstrable need for the
regulation has been established.
V. CONCLUSION
To depreciate or ignore the principle advocated is to enervate
a most venerated tenet. Acceptance of reasons behind a law is usually
thought to encourage obedience to it. And however valid that may
be, certainly the converse is not true. Only a passing reference to this
nation's experience under prohibition should dramatize the point.
It is not only in keeping with firmly held notions about the nature
of an open society, but it is also crucial to the effective adminis-
tration of justice. The very essence of due process would seem to
demand it. Moreover, it is perhaps not an inaccurate estimate of
public opinion to say that most people believe in this idea. The
mere fact that the Model Penal Code, the Attorney-General of New
Mexico, and 8 lower court judges so held is evidence of the contin-
uing vitality of the principle. Thus, in dealing with a self-protective
law, a court ought not adopt the normally sanguine view that
"safety" laws are invariably "beneficial."' 21 The subject ought to be
examined in more detail than that heretofore given it. No one should
be convicted on a mere presumption of wrongdoing.
Kenneth M. Royalty
121 Cf. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928) (Brandeis J., dis-
senting).
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when
the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to freedom are naturally
alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil minded rulers. The greatest
dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well mean-
ing, but without understanding. . . . The makers of the Constitution . . .
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions
and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right
to be let alone--the most comprehensive of rights and right most valued by
civilized man.
Id. at 479, 478.
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